This paper is concerned with a non-zero sum differential game problem of an anticipated forward-backward stochastic differential delayed equation under partial information. We establish a maximum principle and a verification theorem for the Nash equilibrium point by virtue of the duality and convex variation approach. We study a linear-quadratic system under partial information and present an explicit form of the Nash equilibrium point. We derive the filtering equations and prove the existence and uniqueness for the Nash equilibrium point. As an application, we solve a time-delayed pension fund management problem with nonlinear expectation to measure the risk and obtain the explicit solution.
Introduction
The general nonlinear backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) were first developed by Pardoux and Peng [1] and have been widely applied in the optimal control, mathematical finance, and related fields (see Peng [2, 3] , Karoui et al. [4] ). The classical Black-Scholes option pricing formula in the financial market can also be deduced by virtue of the BSDE theory. If a BSDE is coupled with a forward stochastic differential equation (SDE), it is called the forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) . The fundamental research based on FBSDEs has been surveyed by Ma and Yong [5] . FBSDEs are widely encountered in the application of the stochastic recursive utility (see, e.g., Wang and Wu [6] ), financial optimization problem with large investors (see Cvitanic and Ma [7] ), asset pricing problem with differential utilities (see Antonellia et al. [8] ), etc. The classical Hamiltonian system is also one of the forms of FBSDEs in the stochastic control field (see, e.g., Yong and Zhou [9] ).
In classical cases, there are many phenomena that have the nature of past-dependence, i.e., their behavior not only depends on the situation at the present time, but also on their past history. Such models were identified as stochastic differential delayed equations (SDDEs), which are a natural generalization of the classical SDEs and have been widely studied in engineering, life science, finance, and other fields (see, for example, the population growth model in Mohammed [10] , Arriojas et al. [11] ). Chen and Wu [12] first studied a stochastic control problem based on SDDE. When introducing the adjoint equation, they need some new types of BSDEs, which have been introduced by Peng and Yang [13] for the general nonlinear case and called anticipated BSDEs (ABSDEs). The anticipated term defined by the conditional expectation can be regarded as a predicted value of the future state. It can be applied to the insider trading market, describing the asset price influenced by insiders (see, e.g., Øksendal and Sulem [14] , Kyle [15] ). Moreover, a class of BSDEs with time-delayed generators (BSDDEs) has also been studied in the stochastic control field (see Wu and Wang [16] , Shi and Wang [17] , Wu and Shu [18] ). Recently, Chen and Wu [19] , Huang et al. [20] studied a linear-quadratic (LQ) case based on a coupled SDDE and ABSDE called the anticipated forward-backward stochastic differential delayed equation (AFBSDDE).
Game theory has been pervading the economic theory, and it attracts more and more research attention. It was firstly introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [21] . Nash [22] made the fundamental contribution in non-cooperate games and gave the classical notion of Nash equilibrium point. In recent years, many articles on stochastic differential game problems driven by stochastic differential equations have appeared. Researchers try to consider the strategy on multiple players rather than one player and try to find an equilibrium point rather than an optimal control. These problems are more complicated than the classical control problems but much closer to social and behavior science. Yu [23] solved the LQ game problem on a forward and backward system. Øksendal and Sulem [24] , Hui and Xiao [25] made a research on the maximum principle of a forward-backward system. Chen and Yu [26] studied the maximum principle of an SDDE case, Shi and Wang [17] , Wu and Shu [18] discussed a BSDDE case.
In reality, instead of complete information, there are many cases where the controller can only obtain partial information, reflecting in mathematics that the control variable is adapted to a smaller filtration. Based on this phenomenon, Xiong and Zhou [27] dealt with a mean-variance problem in the financial market that the investor's optimal portfolio is only based on the stock process he observed. This assumption of partial information is indeed natural in the financial market. Recently, Wu and Wang [16] , Wu and Shu [18] also considered the partial information case.
To our best knowledge, the research on general AFBSDDEs and its wide applications in mathematical finance are quite lacking in the literature. Recently, Huang and Shi [28] discussed the optimal control problem based on the AFBSDDE system. Our work distinguished itself from the above-mentioned ones in the following aspects. First, we study the stochastic differential game problem with multiple players rather than the control problem with only one controller. We aim to find the equilibrium point rather than the optimal control. Second, we consider the case that the diffusion coefficient can contain control variables and the control field is convex. Third, we deal with the system under partial information that the available information to the players is partial, which can be seen as a generalization of the complete information case. Fourth, we derive the filtering equations of an LQ system and get worthwhile results about the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point. Finally, as an example, we solve a financial problem by virtue of the theoretical results we obtain.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some necessary notions and state some preliminary results. In Section 3, we establish a necessary condition (maximum principle) and a sufficient condition (verification theorem) for the Nash equilibrium point. In Section 4, we study a linear-quadratic game problem under partial information. We derive the filtering equations and prove the existence and uniqueness for the Nash equilibrium point. In Section 5, we solve a pension fund management problem with nonlinear expectation and obtain the explicit solution.
Preliminary results
Throughout this article, we denote by R k the k-dimensional Euclidean space; by R k×l the collection of k × l matrices. For a given Euclidean space, we denote by ·, · (resp. | · |) the scalar product (resp. norm). The superscript τ denotes the transpose of vectors or matrices. Let ( , F, {F t } t≥0 , P) be a complete filtered probability space equipped with a d +d-dimensional, F t -adapted standard Brownian motion (W (·),W (·)), where
denotes the conditional expectation under natural filtration F t , and f x (·) denotes the partial derivative of function f (·) with respect to x. Let T > 0 be the finite time duration and 0 < δ < T be the constant time delay. Moreover, we denote by
We consider the following AFBSDDE:
Here, (
Here, for simplicity, we omit the notation of ω in each process.
Let U i be a nonempty convex subset of R k i , G i t ⊆ F t be a given sub-filtration which represents the information available to the player i, and v i (·) be the control process of player i (i = 1, 2). We denote by U i ad the set of
, and it is called the admissible control set for player i (i = 1, 2).
ad is called the set of admissible controls for the two players. We also introduce the following assumption:
All the partial derivatives of b, σ ,σ , f , G are uniformly bounded. Then we have the following existence and uniqueness result which can be found in [12, 13] . 
The players have their own preferences which are described by the following cost functionals:
Here, l i : 
, and C(1 + |y|), respectively. Now we suppose that each player hopes to maximize his cost functional J i (v 1 (·), v 2 (·)) by selecting a suitable admissible control v i (·) (i = 1, 2). The problem is to find an admissible control (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) ∈ U ad such that
If we can find an admissible control (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) satisfying (2), then we call it a Nash equilibrium point. In what follows, we aim to establish the necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash equilibrium point subject to this game problem.
Maximum principle
In this section, we will establish a necessary condition (maximum principle) and a sufficient condition (verification theorem) for problem (2) .
Let (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) be an equilibrium point of the game problem, (
Then, for any 0 ≤ ≤ 1, we take the variational control u 1 (·) = u 1 (·) + v 1 (·) and u 2 (·) = u 2 (·) + v 2 (·).
Because both U 1 and U 2 are convex, (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is also in U ad . For simplicity, we denote by (
, and (x(·), y(·), z(·),z(·)) the corresponding state trajectories of system (1) with control (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)), (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)), and (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)).
The following lemma gives an estimation of (x(·), y(·), z(·),z(·)).
Proof Using Itô's formula to |x u i (t) -x(t)| 2 and Gronwall's inequality, we draw the conclusion.
For notational simplicity, we set
We introduce the following variational equations:
Next, set
Then we can get the following two lemmas by using Lemma 3.1. The technique is classical (see Chen and Wu [12] ). Thus we omit the details and only state the main result for simplicity.
Lemma 3.3 Let H1 and H2 hold. For i = 1, 2,
We introduce the adjoint equation as
This equation is also an AFBSDDE. By the existence and uniqueness result in [12, 13] , we know that (5) admits a unique solution (
Define the Hamiltonian function H i (i = 1, 2) by
Then (5) can be rewritten as a stochastic Hamiltonian system of the following type:
where
Theorem 3.1 Let H1 and H2 hold. Suppose that (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is an equilibrium point of our problem and (x(·), y(·), z(·),z(·)) is the corresponding state trajectory. Then we have
for any v i ∈ U i a.e., where
) is the solution of the adjoint equation (5).
Proof Applying Itô's formula to q 1 (·), x 1 1 (·) , we get
Noticing the initial and terminal conditions, we have
Similarly, we also have
From (7) and (8), we have
Substituting (9) into (4) leads to
ad . Then we have
Letting → 0, we get
ad . Furthermore, we setv 1 (t) = v 1 1 A + u 1 (t)1 -A for any v 1 ∈ U 1 and A ∈ G 1 t , then it is obvious thatv 1 (·) defined above is an admissible control.
So
for any v 1 ∈ U 1 . Repeating the same process to deal with the case i = 2, we can show that the other equality also holds for any v 2 ∈ U 2 .
is an equilibrium point of non-zero sum differential game and (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is an interior point of U 1 × U 2 for all t ∈ [0, T], then the inequality in Theorem 3.1 is equivalent to the following equation:
Proof It is obvious that the "⇐" part holds. For the "⇒" part, we assume that a Nash equilibrium point (u 1 On the other hand, we will aim to build a sufficient maximum principle called the verification theorem for the equilibrium point under some concavity assumptions of H i . At this moment, assumption H2 can be relaxed to the following:
H3. Functions l i , i , and γ i are differentiable with respect to (x, y, z,z, v 1 , v 2 ), x, and y, respectively, satisfying the condition that for each 
are concave functions respectively, and
) be the trajectory corresponding to the control (v 1 (·), u 2 (·)) ∈ U ad . We consider
where (t) = (x(t), y(t), z(t),z(t)) and
Since γ 1 is concave on y, then
Applying Itô's formula to p 1 (·), y v 1 (·) -y(·) and taking expectation, we get
Due to 1 being concave on x,
Applying Itô's formula to q 1 (·), x v 1 (·) -x(·) and taking expectation, we get
From (10)- (12), we can obtain
Note that
due to the fact that x v 1 (t) = x(t) = ξ (t) for any t ∈ [-δ, 0) and H 1x δ (t) = 0 for any t ∈
(T, T + δ].
Similarly, we have
due to the fact that y v 1 
(t) = y(t) = ϕ(t) for any t ∈ (T, T + δ] and H 1y δ + (t) = 0 for any t ∈
[-δ, 0). By the concavity of H 1 , we derive that
From the necessary condition (6), it follows that
Repeating the same process to deal with the case i = 2, we can draw the desired conclusion.
In conclusion, with the help of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, we can formally solve the Nash equilibrium point (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)). We can first use the necessary principle to get the candidate equilibrium point and then use the verification theorem to check whether the candidate point is the equilibrium one. Let us discuss a linear-quadratic case.
A linear-quadratic case
In this section, we study a linear-quadratic case, which can be seen as a special case of the general system discussed in Section 3, and aim to give a unique Nash equilibrium point explicitly. For notational simplification, we suppose the dimension of Brownian motion d =d = 1 and notations are the same as in the above sections if there is no specific illustration.
Consider a linear game system with delayed and anticipated states:
where all the coefficients are bounded, deterministic matrices defining on
For any given (v 1 (·), v 2 (·)) ∈ U ad , it is easy to know that (13) admits a unique solution (
Here, we only consider the case that x v (·) is driven by one Brownian motion W (·) just for notational simplicity. All the techniques and proof are similar. In addition, two players aim to maximize their index functionals for i = 1, 2:
where O i (·), P i (·), Q i (·),Q i (·) are bounded deterministic non-positive symmetric matrices, R i (·) is a bounded deterministic negative symmetric matrix, R -1 i (·) is bounded, M i , N i are deterministic non-positive symmetric matrices for i = 1, 2.
According to Theorem 3.1, the Hamiltonian function is given by
If (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is the Nash equilibrium point, then
) is the solution of the following adjoint equation:
We note that the setting G t ⊆ F t is very general. In order to get an explicit expression of the equilibrium point, we suppose G t = σ {W (s); 0 ≤ s ≤ t} in the rest of this section.
We denote the filtering of state process x(t) byx(t) = E[x(t)|G t ], etc., and note that
. By Theorem 8.1 in Lipster and Shiryayev [29] and Theorem 5.7 (Kushner-FKK equation) in Xiong [30] , we can get the state filtering equation for (13):
dŷ(t) = {E(t)x(t) + F(t)ŷ(t) + G(t)ẑ(t) +Ḡ(t)ẑ(t) +F(t)E
, and the adjoint filtering equation for (15) satisfying
From Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, it is easy to know that (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is an equilibrium point for the above linear-quadratic game problem if and only if (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) satisfies the expression of (14) with (x,ŷ,ẑ,p i ,q i ,k i ) (i = 1, 2) being the solution of the coupled triple dimensions filtering AFBSDDE (16)- (17) (TFBSDDE). Then the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point is equivalent to the existence and uniqueness of the TFBSDDE.
However, we note that TFBSDDE (16)- (17) is so complicated. Fortunately, in some particular cases, we can make some transactions to link it with a double dimensions filtering AFBSDDE, called DFBSDDE. Now we present our result in the following.
H4. The dimension of x is equal to that of y: n = m,Ḡ(t) ≡ 0 and coefficients
= H i are independent of time t for any i = 1, 2.
Theorem 4.1 Under H4, we assume that one of the following conditions holds true:
is a unique Nash equilibrium point.
Proof
We only prove (a). The same method can be used to get (b) and (c). From the above discussion, we need to prove only that there exists a unique solution of the coupled TFB-SDDE (16)- (17) . In the case that
Now we consider another DFBSDDE:
From the commutation relation between matrices, we notice that, if (x,ŷ,ẑ,p i ,q i ,k i ) (i = 1, 2) is a solution of (18), then (x,ỹ,z,p,q,k) solves (19) , where
On the other hand, if (x,ỹ,z,p,q,k) is a solution of (19), we can letx(t) =x(t),ŷ(t) =ỹ(t), z(t) =z(t). From the existence and uniqueness result of SDDE and ABSDE (see [12, 13] ), we can get (p i (t),q i (t),k i (t)) from the following filtering AFBSDDE:
We let
By Itô's formula and the uniqueness result of the solution of the SDDE and ABSDE for fixed (x(·),ŷ(·),ẑ(·)), we have
. (21) Then (x,ŷ,ẑ,p i ,q i ,k i ) (i = 1, 2) is a solution of (18) . Moreover, the existence and uniqueness of (19) is equivalent to the existence and uniqueness of (18) . According to the monotonicity condition in [19, 28] , it is easy to check that DFBSDDE (19) satisfies the condition and it has a unique solution. So TFBSDDE (18) admits a unique solution. We complete the proof.
An example in finance
This section is devoted to studying a pension fund management problem under partial information with time-delayed surplus arising from the financial market, which naturally motivates the above theoretical research. The financial market is the Black-Scholes market, while the pension fund management framework comes from Federico [31] . To get close to reality, we study this problem in the case when the performance criterion J i (v 1 (·), v 2 (·)) is measured by a criterion involving risk. If we interpret risk in the sense of a convex risk measure, it can be performed by a nonlinear expectation called g-expectation, which can also be used to represent a nonlinear human preference in behavioral economics (see [3, [32] [33] [34] [35] and recent articles [25, 36, 37] ). Now we introduce it in detail.
In the following, we only consider the one-dimensional case just for simplicity of notations. First, we give the definition of convex risk measure and its connection with gexpectation.
Definition 5.1 ([32] ) Let F be the family of all lower bounded F T -measurable random variables. A convex risk measure on F is a functional ρ :
The convex risk measure is a useful tool widely applied in the measurement of financial positions. For the financial interpretation (see, e.g., [34] ), the property (a) in Definition 5.1 means that the risk of a diversified position is not more than the weighted average of the individual risks; (b) means that if portfolio X 2 is better than X 1 under almost all scenarios, then the risk of X 2 should be less than the risk of X 1 ; (c) implies that the addition of a sure amount of capital reduces the risk by the same amount. It is also a generalization of the concept of coherent risk measure in [38] . Here, if ρ(X) ≤ 0, then position X is called acceptable, and ρ(X) represents the maximal amount that investors can withdraw without changing the acceptability of X. If ρ(X) ≥ 0, then X is called unacceptable and ρ(X) represents the minimal extra wealth that investors have to add into the position X to make it acceptable.
Consider the following BSDE:
Under certain assumptions, (22) has a unique solution (y(·), z(·)). If we also set g(t, y, z)| z=0 ≡ 0, we can make the definition as follows. The well-known Allais [39] and Ellsberg [40] paradox indicates that the classical vonNeumann-Morgenstern linear expected utility theory (here we mean that the linear expectation E is used) cannot exactly express people's subjective preferences or criterion involving risk. Then one naturally tries to replace E by some kind of nonlinear expectation. From Definition 5.2, the g-expectation E g (·) based on the BSDE possesses all the properties that E has, except the linearity (see [3] ). It can be seen as a (subject) nonlinear preference and is closely related to the stochastic differential utility (see, e.g., [4] ). It is obvious that when g(·) = 0, E g is reduced to the classical expectation E.
Here, we present the g-expectation as a nonlinear measurement of risk and give the connection between the convex risk measure and the g-expectation as follows (see [33, 41] for more details).
Definition 5.3
The risk ρ(ξ ) of the random variable ξ ∈ L 2 F ( ; R) (ξ can be regarded as a financial position in the financial market) is defined by
is defined in Definition 5.2 with ξ replaced by -ξ . Here, g is independent of y and is convex with respect to z.
Assuming that there are two assets in the financial market for the pension fund managers to invest:
where S 1 (·) is a risky finance asset price and S 0 (·) is one risk-free asset price. μ(·) is an appreciation rate of the asset process, and σ (·) is the volatility coefficient. We assume that μ(·), r(·) and σ (·) are deterministic bounded coefficients, and σ -1 (·) is bounded.
Suppose that there are two pension fund managers (players) working together to invest the risk-free and risky assets. In the real financial market, it is reasonable for the investors to make decisions based on the historical price of the risky asset S 1 (·). So the observable filtration can be set as G t = σ {S 1 (s)|0 ≤ s ≤ t}, and it is clear that
The pension fund wealth x(·) can be modeled by
Here, we denote by π(t) the amount of portfolio invested in the risky asset at time t, and α(x(t) -x(t -δ)) represents the surplus premium to fund members or their capital transfusions depending on the performance of fund growth during the past period with parameter α > 0 (see, e.g., [16, 17] ). Meanwhile, there is an instantaneous consumption rate c i (t) for manager i (i = 1, 2). We assume that the value of x(·) is not only affected by the risky asset, but also by some practical phenomena like the physical inaccessibility of some economic parameters, inaccuracies in measurement, insider trading or the information asymmetry, etc. (see, e.g., [42, 43] ). Here,σ (·) represents the instantaneous volatility affected by these unobservable factors, FW t represents the unobservable filtration generated byW (·). We set x(t) be adapted to the filtration F t generated by Brownian motion (W (·),W (·)), and the control processes c i (t) (i = 1, 2) be adapted to the observation filtra-
, and the family of admissible control
We assume that the insurance company hopes for more terminal capital with less risks and more consumption c i (·). According to Definitions 5.1 and 5.3, we can define the cost functional as is a deterministic bounded coefficient.
Then our problem is naturally to find an equilibrium point (c * 
dx(t) = (r(t)x(t) + (μ(t) -r(t))π(t) -α(x(t) -x(t -δ))
-c 1 (t) -c 2 (t)) dt + π(t)σ (t) dW (t) +σ (t) dW (t), -dy(t) = g(t)z(t) dt -z(t) dW (t), t ∈ [0, T],
x(t) = 0, t ∈ [-δ, 0), 
Now we will apply the theoretical results obtained in Section 3 to solve the above game problem. The Hamiltonian function is in the form of H i t, x(t), y(t), z(t), x δ (t), c 1 (t), c 2 (t); p i (t), q i (t), k i (t),k i (t) = q i (t) r(t)x(t) + μ(t) -r(t) π(t) -α x(t) -x(t -δ) -c 1 (t) -c 2 (t) + k i (t)π(t)σ (t) +k i (t)σ (t) -p i (t)g(t)z(t) + e -βt Now we have to deal withq i (t), the optimal filtering of q i (t) on the observation G t . We also setp i (t) = E[p i (t)|G t ]. Note that E E q i (t + δ)|F t |G t = E q i (t + δ)|G t = E E q i (t + δ)|G t+δ |G t = E q i (t + δ)|G t .
Then, by Theorem 8.1 in [30] , we have ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ dp i (t) = g(t)p i (t) dW (t),
From (28), we can derive the explicit expression ofp i (t) aŝ Next, we will solve the anticipated BSDE ofq i (t) recursively. This method can also be found in [44, 45] .
there are four distinguishing features worthy of being highlighted. First, we considered the time-delayed system, which has wide applications and can explain various past-dependent situations. Second, we studied the game problem with multiple players and aimed to find the Nash equilibrium point other than the optimal control. We established a necessary condition (maximum principle) and a sufficient condition (verification theorem) by virtue of the duality and convex variation approach. Third, we discussed an LQ system under the partial information condition. Applying the stochastic filtering formula, we derived the filtering equation and proved the existence and uniqueness of the filtering equation and the corresponding Nash equilibrium point. Fourth, we solved a pension fund management problem with a nonlinear expectation to measure the risk (convex risk measure) and obtained the explicit solution.
